Will the Stars Align? What the Creation of an EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine May Mean for Ireland

On 17 October 2022, the European Council announced the creation of an European Union Assistance Mission (EUMAM) for Ukraine to provide a training for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) and enhance its military capacity and resilience.  Ireland’s involvement in this mission will present challenges for the Irish Government, not only given the constraints placed on the deployment of the Defence Forces abroad without a UN mandate, but simultaneously due to decisions taken by the Irish Government early in the war to opt out of full participation in the European Peace Facility by choosing not to fund the transfer of lethal equipment to the Ukrainians following the most recent Russian invasion in February 2022. Ireland’s Minister for Defence and for Foreign Affairs, Simon Coveney, has stated that Ireland is likely to provide training for mine-clearance and counter IED’s as part of the EUMAM mission. However, specific questions remain about the extent to which Ireland can participate in EUMAM Ukraine, as well as about the restrictions Ireland’s defence policy places on the roles Ireland could play in the mission on the ground.   

What Will the Mission Do?

The European Union (EU) has maintained a civilian assistance mission in Ukraine since December 2014 under the banner of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). The Ukrainian government reached out to the EU for help following the Euromaidan revolution in 2013. Since then, through the auspices of the EUAM, the EU has provided assistance in the field of civilian security sector reform in accordance with EU standards and human rights. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, the EUAM has assisted local security forces to facilitate the flow of refugees out of Ukraine and the entry of aid into the country.

Historically, EU training missions have served to support the set-up, restructuring, and deployment of armed forces by providing training to local security forces at the request of a host state. More generally, there tends to be a focus on ‘training the trainers’ to build capacity within a host state’s armed forces.

At present, there are seven ongoing established EU military training missions, operating in places such as Mali, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique. Ireland has deployed 20 members of its forces to assist with the EUTM in Mali. To date, this mission has delivered training for Malian Armed Forces units across a range of areas including in effective command and control practices, logistics and human resources, and training in international humanitarian law and human rights.

The proposed ‘EUMAM Ukraine’ will differ significantly from the extant EUAM since it would be explicitly designed to focus on building military, rather than civilian capacities. The specific tasks, aims, and objectives of this mission are yet to be defined but the mission will provide training for 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the area of tactics, manoeuvre and combined arms; medical and demining; cyber security and cyber defence; chemical, radiological and nuclear protection training and training to maintain and repair equipment. It has also been reported that the mission may provide more specific tactical training  training for snipers and elite forces. The mission will thus provide significant assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) not only through the provision of technical training and skills but by also seeking to alleviate the AFU’s training burden.

What are Others Doing

Many Western countries are already involved in training Ukrainian soldiers in EU Member States in the use of artillery weapon systems that have been provided by Western allies, such as the American High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). On top of this, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands have provided tactical training to 5000 Ukrainian troops in the UK as part of the Interflex programme. This programme trains Ukrainian forces in a range of skills, including in relation to tactical medicine, engineering, and psychological and urban warfare. The proposed EUMAM is designed to allow Member States who are already directly offering support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces to better coordinate their efforts and to increase the tactical and operational effectiveness of the AFU.

Ireland’s Options

As the EU moves to establish its new programme to train the Ukrainian armed forces, Ireland will have to choose between a range of options relating to how it may (or may not) participate in such a venture.

Thus, Ireland can choose to:

1. contribute to the financing of the mission and to not provide troops;
2. contribute troops to the mission, but only to train soldiers performing non-lethal tasks such as mine clearance and medical assistance;
3. participate in the mission and provide full-spectrum combat training in line with the Irish Defence Forces’ capabilities;
4. opt-out of the mission entirely.

How will Ireland’s Defence Policy likely influence Irish Participation in ‘EUTM Ukraine’?

Ireland’s defence policy will, naturally, determine the extent of the country’s participation in the ‘EUMAM Ukraine’ mission. From among the many factors that any Irish government would need to assess and consider, the absence of a UN Mandate for the mission will be of central importance. Unlike the EU’s mission in Mali, which has a UN Mandate, and works in concert with the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA), there will be no UN Mandate for a mission in Ukraine, partly due to Russian opposition on the UN Security Council. As a result, Ireland’s deployment of its forces will be influenced by the ‘triple lock’ which describes Ireland’s requirement for a UN Resolution, Government decision, and a Resolution of the Irish parliament before armed troops can be deployed outside of the state. Though a UN Mandate is not necessarily required to participate or conduct in training, the Irish Defence Forces have only participated in missions that are either part of or parallel to a UN Mandated Missions. In this regard, the ‘triple lock’, though it does not place legal constraints on participating in EUMAMs, has ostensibly acted as a normative force in determining Ireland’s mission preferences. Ireland’s participation in EUMAM Ukraine would be somewhat of an exception compared to previous government policy on the use of the Defence Forces in non-UN Mandated missions. An example of this preference may be seen in the ongoing EUTM Mozambique, where at present there is no UN Mandate for the Mission, and which Ireland does not participate in – though it is not de jure restricted from doing so and could possibly participate in the future.

The decision to opt-out from providing lethal equipment to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February may also influence the roles the Defence Forces could perform in this mission. For example, the Irish Defence Forces are likely to focus on providing training for non-lethal roles such as tactical medical, mine clearance, and CBRN training in line with previous Government policy regarding the provision of support for Ukraine under EUMAM Ukraine.  By focusing on the non-lethal part of EUMAM such as mine clearance, as Minister Coveney has indicated, the government could balance the public perception of departing from previous norms governing deployment of the Defence Forces with the clear need for Ireland to offer its expertise and training to the AFU.  

Correspondingly. in this context, a decision to provide lethal tactical training to Ukrainian troops, while abstaining from funding the provision of lethal equipment, may present a policy contradiction and too great a normative departure that the present Government would be unwilling or unable to accept.

In its provision of support for Ukraine to date, Ireland has provided funding for the purchase of non-lethal equipment such as personal protective equipment, medical kits, and fuel without directly sending equipment from its military stockpiles. Though not yet the stated preference of the Government, Ireland may choose to support the mission financially, rather than sending soldiers to train Ukrainian forces. Choosing to only contribute money to the mission may enable Ireland to manage the optics of a non-UN Mandated deployment and would allow the Government to avoid any potential contradictions with its previous policies towards the war in Ukraine.

Implications

Whether Ireland participates in any proposed EU military training mission in Ukraine will likely have consequences for Ireland’s foreign and security policy either way. With Russia steadfastly vetoing resolutions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) concerning its war in Ukraine, ‘EUMAM Ukraine’ raises questions about the continued efficacy and relevance of the Irish Government’s ‘triple lock’ and on how Ireland chooses to participate in multilateral military activities in the future. Starkly, given its intransigence on the UNSC, Russia has been able to indirectly determine the nature of Irish participation in the EU’s attempts to support Ukraine, given Ireland’s historical preference for the presence of a UN mandate when deploying troops.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has ushered in ever increasing alignment in defence policies between EU Member States. With the publication of the Strategic Compass, the EU’s security strategy, the Union is now seeking to play an increasing role in the collective security of the EU Member States. Indeed, the war in Ukraine has also generated increasing solidarity within the EU and a greater appetite to pool resources when it comes to security and defence. Ireland’s decision to opt-out of the mission, or at the very least, to not participate to the fullest extent, may be read as a lack of engagement by the country’s European partners. Thus, at a time where the Union seems to be growing ever closer, Ireland may in fact be drifting away when it comes to collective security.

Conclusion

The EU’s decision to establish a training mission to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces will allow for greater coordination between Member States when it comes to the delivery of training programmes that are already in existence. It will also allow for the more efficient use of resources and should free up capacity within the AFU which can be focused on conducting operations against the Russian invasion.

Clearly, as the planned EUMAM mission comes into existence, the Irish Government will need to decide how the country can participate in the mission. This will inevitably have implications for Ireland’s security and defence policy as well as for its place in the EU. All this also highlights the need to reflect on the effect of the ‘triple lock’ on Irish security and defence policy, and on Irish public policy more broadly, and whether Russia’s actions at the Security Council can have the potential to limit Ireland’s ability to assist Ukraine.

The EU is undergoing a moment of evolution amid clear moves to foster greater solidarity between Member States when it comes to the risks posed by external threats. Consequently, while defence policies of other Member States are coming into greater alignment, the Irish Government must carefully review its security policies and be prepared to justify them.