The Outcome of the European Parliament Elections – A Kaleidoscope of Combinations | IIEA
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The Outcome of the European Parliament Elections – A Kaleidoscope of Combinations

Just as the patterns in a kaleidoscope continually change and form new combinations as it turns, the European Parliament’s configurations are recast as political currents swell across the Continent and in Brussels and Strasbourg. As the dust settles after the European Parliament elections, which took place across Europe between 6-9 June 2024, we may see a new dynamic in EU politics emerge.

In the elections, 720 Members of the new European Parliament (MEPs) were elected for the next five-year term, from 2024 to 2029. Overall, the mainstream grand coalition which has been governing the EU since its inception – the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-left Socialist and Democrats (S&D), and the centrist liberal Renew Europe (RE) – retained their majority in the European Parliament, despite a net loss of 36 seats. [i] On the other hand, while the far-right made advances in some Member States, they did not perform as well as some analysts and observers had expected, as predicted in a recent IIEA publication.

Of the existing seven European Parliament political groups, the national-conservative European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) saw the largest net gain, potentially up 14 seats to a total of 83 MEPs and overtaking the centrist liberal RE as the third-largest political group in the Parliament.[ii]  This raises the question as to the consequences which the increased weight of the ECR may have for the top EU jobs and legislative priorities in the Union for the next five years – with Meloni emphasising defence and security over the European Green Deal.[iii]

On the other hand, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who is seeking a second term in office, will likely have to rely on S&D votes to secure re-election by the European Parliament. This may temper the influence of the ECR – as many socialist leaders have set out a red line against cooperation with parties such as the ruling far-right nationalist party in Italy, Fratelli d’Italia, led by Prime Minister Georgia Meloni. [iv] With the Italian Partito Democratico now being the largest single national party in the group, this S&D red-line could be a determinant factor in von der Leyen’s re-election.

This blog looks through the kaleidoscope and seeks to interpret its changing patterns, with consolidation at the centre and fragmentation on the margins, divergent trends between individual Member States, and new elements in voter behaviour due to social media and voter demographics. The complexity and interconnectedness of patterns which may not be obvious in the immediate aftermath of the elections, may become clearer over the next weeks and months ahead when the new President of the European Parliament will be elected at a plenary session on 16-19 July and new political groups may be formed in advance of this first sitting.

Fragmentation of the Political Groups in the European Parliament

The recent elections saw a large number of unaligned parties elected, with 87 MEPs now currently sitting as non-inscrits (NI). [v] This NI formation may not remain so large for long, on account of the potential creation of new political groupings ahead of the first plenary sitting of the European Parliament on 16-19 July 2024. Currently, there are seven political groupings in the European Parliament, but this number could increase due to fragmentation. There is the potential for a number of groups to emerge, some of which are more likely than others. One such is a left-wing conservative political group dominated by the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (NI), Movimento 5 Stelle (NI), and Prime Minister Robert Fico’s Smer (NI). [vi] Another is a new radical far-right political group anchored around Alternative für Deutschland (NI) and Konfederacja (NI). [vii] In recent days, with the departure of the Czech ANO 2011 (NI) from the liberal RE group, Fidesz (NI) remaining politically homeless, and divisions within the ECR group between Fratelli d’Italia and the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, some observers have posited that a new broad central European populist group may emerge in the Parliament. [viii]

Varied Patterns across the 27 Member States

It is difficult to draw one single trend across the electoral results in 27 different Member States. In several core Eurozone Member States of Western Europe where major electoral issues related to the cost-of-living crisis and inflation are directly linked to policy decisions taken at an EU level in Brussels and Frankfurt am Main, Eurosceptic and nationalist far-right parties gained significant ground – such as in Austria with the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (ID), France with Rassemblement National (ID), Germany with Alternative für Deutschland (NI), and Italy with Fratelli d’Italia (ECR). [ix]

Furthermore, particularly in France and Italy, there was a re-emergence of the left-right political divide and a decline of the ni-droit-ni-gauche of Emmanuel Macron and the anti-systemic populism of Movimento 5 Stelle (NI) – although in both countries, the competition is between multiple fragmented parties on each side of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, the surge in the far-right vote did not achieve the level predicted by some prior to the elections.

On the other hand, in several Member States, particularly in the Nordic Member States, far-right nationalist parties previous gains to centre-left social democratic parties, green parties, and left-wing parties. In Denmark, the green Socialistisk Folkeparti (G/EFA) topped the poll and gained a historic result; in Finland, the left-wing Vasemmistoliitto (GUE/NGL) came in second place with its best electoral result ever; while in Sweden, the left-wing Vänsterpartiet (GUE/NGL) and the green Miljöpartiet de Gröna (G/EFA) saw the largest vote increases compared to the 2019 European elections.[x] In all the Nordic Member States, the far-right nationalist parties of the Dansk Folkeparti (ID), Sverigedemokraterna (ECR), and Perussuomalaiset (ECR) saw a decline of between two and six percentage points.[xi]

The Youth Vote and Social Media

The youth vote in 2024 was quite different from that of 2019. The 2019 European Parliament elections took place during the dizzying heights of the climate movement and strikes led by Greta Thunberg and other youth activists across the continent. Against that backdrop, and thanks to widespread youth support, green parties across many of the Member States achieved historic results and the G/EFA group in the European Parliament reached its greatest size.

It is worth noting that in the 2024 European Parliament elections, it was the first time that EU citizens over the age of 16 were enfranchised in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Malta while those above the age of 17 were so in Greece – opening up the political arena to first-time, new, and young voters.

In 2024, youth preferences changed and saw green and left-wing parties in several Member States losing significant portions of their youth core constituency. Amongst voters under the age of 35 in both France and Germany, right wing parties, Rassemblement National (ID) and Alternative für Deutschland (NI) saw an approximate 10 percentage point increase amongst youth voters compared to their 2019 results. [xii] Further, polling indicates that Spanish youth, particularly young male voters, support Vox (ECR) and the radical far-right Se Acabó la Fiesta (NI) at higher levels than other age-groups. [xiii] Although this was not a uniform trend, with Italian youth overwhelmingly supporting the social democratic Partito Democratico (S&D), Movimento 5 Stelle (NI), and the green-left Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra coalition (G/EFA-GUE/NGL).[xiv]

Jordan Bardella, head of the Rassemblement National (ID) list for the elections, saw a relatively high popularity amongst young voters in France and placed second amongst 18–24-year-olds, after La France Insoumise (GUE/NGL). [xv] Part of Bardella’s success in France has been ascribed to his effective use of social media, particularly TikTok, where he managed to engage and mobilise large portions of the youth vote.[xvi]

This type of instrumentalisation of social media played a key role in the emergence of political outsiders in several Member States. In Spain, the far-right Se Acabó la Fiesta (NI), and its leader Alvise Pérez, effectively utilised meme culture on social media to gain support amongst the youth vote to overtake the once-mighty Podemos (GUE/NGL) in the final results. [xvii] Fidias Panayiotou, a YouTuber with over two million subscribers, came from outside the long-established party system to win one of the Cyprus’ six seats in the Parliament by utilising his social media outlets to connect with and garner the vote of young people.[xviii]

This strong emergence of new social media strategies in several Member States potentially signals a shift in political culture amongst youth, with a movement away from traditional parties broadcasting their messages and policies to more personalised strategies through influencer-style campaigns on social media.

Conclusion

As the kaleidoscope turns ahead of the first plenary sitting on 16-19 July of the European Parliament and coalitions crystalise, policies and priorities should mirror those of citizens’ concerns. While the centrist parties fared relatively well in the elections, particularly the EPP, it is now the responsibility of these newly elected MEPs to be reactive to citizens and engage those voters who feel left-behind or unrepresented in contemporary politics. Furthermore, if these centrist parties and politicians are serious about holding the far-right at bay, they should be vigilant to not further normalise the policies and rhetoric of the far-right which threaten to undermine the democratic foundations and fundamental freedoms in Europe.

[i] ‘Comparative tool: European results’ (European Parliament, 27 June 2024) accessed 27 June 2024

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Francesco Olivo, 'Nomine Ue, accordo vicino. Il Ppe apre a Meloni : “Priorità all’immigrazione”' La Stampa (Turin, 24 June 2024) accessed 24 June 2024.

[iv] Iratxe García Pérez on x.com (x.com, 26 June 2024) accessed 27 June 2024.

[v] ‘Comparative tool: European results’ (European Parliament, 27 June 2024) accessed 27 June 2024.

[vi] Tobias Gerhard Schminke, ‘A European Wagenknecht Group?’ Europe Elects (Oberroßbach, 23 April 2024) accessed 12 June 2024.

[vii] Timo Lehmann and Ann-Katrin Müller, ‘AfD startet Fraktionsgründung »Die Souveränisten«’ DER SPIEGEL (Hamburg, 22 June 2024) accessed 25 June 2024.

[viii] Eddy Wax, ‘Poland’s Law and Justice ‘50/50’ about leaving Giorgia Meloni and joining forces with Viktor Orbán’ POLITICO Europe (Brussels, 27 June 2024) accessed 27 June 2024.

[ix] Comparative tool: National results (European Parliament, 27 June 2024) accessed 27 June 2024.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Nicholas Vinocur and Victor Goury-Laffont, ‘Europe’s ‘foreigners out!’ generation: Why young people vote far right’ POLITICO Europe (Brussels, 17 June 2024) accessed 19 June 2024.

[xiii] Sarah Marsh, Barbara Erling and David Latona, ‘How the far-right gained traction with Europe's youth’ Reuters (Berlin/Warsaw/Madrid, 13 June 2024) accessed 19 June 2024.

[xiv] ‘Europee, tra gli under 30 volano Pd, M5S e Avs. FdI quarto partito, Azione sopra la Lega’ Il Messaggero (Rome, 10 June 2024) accessed 19 June 2024.

[xv] ‘Sociologie des Électorats et Profil des Abstentionnistes’ (Ipsos France, 9 June 2024) accessed 19 June 2024.

[xvi] Camille Bordenet, Charlotte Bozonnet, Clément Guillou, Léa Iribarnegaray and Corentin Lesueur, ‘Cette jeunesse qui votera pour Jordan Bardella et le RN aux élections européennes’ Le Monde (Paris, 28 May 2024) accessed 20 June 2024.

[xvii]Menelaos Hadjicostis and Joseph Wilson, ‘2 political outliers claim seats in European Parliament by leveraging social media’s viral power’ AP News (Nicosia, 17 June 2024) accessed 20 June 2024.

[xviii] Ibid.