The 2022 Swedish Elections: The Sweden Democrats Come in From the Cold  | IIEA
Hit enter to search or ESC to close

The 2022 Swedish Elections: The Sweden Democrats Come in From the Cold 

 The 2022 Swedish Elections: The Sweden Democrats Come in From the Cold 

On Sunday, 11 September 2022, Sweden held scheduled elections for the 349 seat Riksdag, the Swedish national parliament. The result saw a close victory of just three seats for the centre-right bloc, led by the Moderate Party, and a slight decline for the incumbent centre-left bloc, led by the Social Democrats. However, the big winner of the election was the far-right Sweden Democrats, who sit outside the two main electoral alliances and emerged as the second largest political party.

Swedish Politics in Brief

Sweden is a unicameral parliamentary democracy, with the parliament containing both legislative and executive power through an elected government. Elections are held every four years, on the second Sunday in September.

Ahead of the election, the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna) was the largest political party in parliament, with 100 seats, forming a single-party minority government, with support from the broadly centrist Centre (Centerpartiet), the left-wing Left (Vänsterpartiet), and the Green (Miljöpartiet) parties. The Social Democratic Party has been led by Magdalena Andersson, Sweden’s first female prime minister, since 4 November 2021. Her premiership followed the resignation of former Prime Minister Stefan Löfven (2014-2021) following the previous coalition government’s collapse.

The opposition is represented by the centre-right Moderate Party (Moderaterna), who were the second largest party with 70 seats, and the far-right Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), who were the third largest with 62 seats, alongside the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and the Liberals (Liberalerna).

Representatives in the 349-seat Riksdag are elected through proportional representation for four-year terms, with seats allocated according to party vote shares, provided they reach a minimum of 4% of the national vote, or 12% of the vote for a single constituency. In the event of a snap election, those MPs elected mid-term will serve out the remainder of the four-year term. 310 seats are distributed across 29 multi-seat constituencies, with the remaining 29 seats allocated to rectify any discrepancies when allocating fixed seats at national or constituency level. Voters elect MPs through open party lists, and parties can form electoral alliances or blocs for the purposes of seat allocation if they choose.

Results & Analysis

Of the 9,416,006 eligible voters in Sweden, 84.1% cast their ballots, this was down 3.1% compared with the previous election in 2018 which had a turnout of 87.2%

Table 1. Election Results  

Party    No. of Seats - 2022    No. of Seats – 2018    Change Up/Down   
Social Democratic Party  107  100  +7 
Sweden Democrats  73  62  +11 
Moderate Party  68  70  -2 
Centre Party  24  31  -7 
Left Party  24  28  -4 
Christian Democrats  19  22  -3 
Green Party  18  16  +2 
Liberals  16  20  -4 

While they did not become the largest party, and their ultimate participation in any future coalition government remains uncertain, the biggest winners are arguably the Sweden Democrats who sit outside the traditional centre-left and centre-right blocs. The result cemented the far-right party as the second largest in parliament with 73 seats, an increase of 11, and the effective leader of the right-wing of Swedish politics. The Sweden Democrat leader, Jimmie Åkesson, is unlikely to become Prime Minister, but the result has essentially dismantled the political cordon sanitaire around his party and brought it into the Swedish political mainstream. The Green Party also had a successful election, as the only left-wing party besides the Social Democrats to increase their seats, claiming an extra two. They campaigned on a message of increased investment in green technologies and public transport, although they remained opposed to Swedish NATO membership. NATO membership enjoys considerable support among the Swedish electorate and the Green position on this issue may have dampened public support for the party. 

Although their seat share increased by seven seats to 107, the ruling Social Democrats are arguably the immediate losers of the election. On Thursday, 15 September 2022, Magdalena Andersson announced that she had conceded the election, and would resign as Prime Minister and move to the opposition benches. However, given Ms Andersson’s continuing popularity, she is likely to remain party leader. Each of the parties on the traditional right of Swedish politics, - the Moderates, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats - experienced a decline in support, losing two, seven and three seats respectively, at the expense of the Sweden Democrats. The far-left Left Party also lost four seats, down to 24. This decline may be attributable to their opposition to Swedish NATO membership, or their role in bringing down the 2021 coalition government under former Prime Minister Löfven. 

The election result can be seen as the development of a new political equilibrium in Sweden, where the rise of the far-right Sweden Democrats has disrupted the traditional two-party system of Swedish politics which had been traditionally dominated by left-leaning coalitions under the Social Democrats or right-leaning alliances under the Moderates. Though they have spent many years in the political cold, the Sweden Democrats have, since 2018, effectively forged a loose affiliation at the local and national levels with right-wing parties, including the Moderates.  

Immigration and integration policy was a central theme of the election, and the popularity of the Sweden Democrats, for whom immigration is a key policy priority, appears to have had the effect of causing a general shift in the election rhetoric of the major parties. For example, the Social Democrats Former Prime Minister Andersson, in an interview during the campaign, stressed that she did not want any “Chinatowns”, “Somalitown” or “Little Italy” in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats’ consistent messaging that Prime Minister Andersson’s government was too relaxed on immigration and had failed to tackle gun-related violent crime seems to have been effective and was reflected in their high-polling numbers.  

Implications for Ireland and the EU  

As the now second largest party in the Riksdag, the Sweden Democrats are seemingly well positioned to secure policy concessions from a right-wing coalition government, even if they are not invited to formally become members of one. This situation could however present a challenge for Moderate leader, Ulf Kristersson, who has been tasked with forming a government: the Liberals, Moderates, and Christian Democrats have all stated that they will not permit the Sweden Democrats to hold ministerial positions in a coalition government.  

If a conservative coalition government under the Moderates were to be established with a confidence-and-supply arrangement with the Sweden Democrats, it could face immediate challenges over divergent approaches to the economy and social welfare. The Moderates are in favour of reducing public expenditure, while the Sweden Democrats strongly support greater unemployment insurance, health care provisions, and social supports for Swedish citizens. Whether this divergence can be reconciled remains to be seen, but the economic pressures on the public purse in the context of rising global energy and commodity prices and an aging population may strain any confidence-and-supply agreement reached between the Sweden Democrats, and a Moderate-led minority coalition government with only 103 seats.  

Given this slim majority of just three seats, the departure or rebellion of just two MPs could potentially collapse a right-wing government. In this event, Moderate leader Mr Kristersson could in extremis be forced into a choice between either forming a centrist coalition with the Social Democrats, or else a closer agreement or even a formal coalition with the Sweden Democrats and other right-wing parties. While this latter scenario appears to be an outlier, it could lead to a situation in which the Sweden Democrats could secure several pivotal ministries, such as Justice or Home Affairs, which could have significant implications for domestic policy.  

These recent and potential developments may contribute to greater political polarisation and fragility in Sweden, which has traditionally been a strong advocate for a more open and liberal trade-based vision of the European Union – a vision broadly shared by Ireland. While the next government is likely to be led by the Moderate Party, who support liberal free-trade policies, the degree of influence from the Sweden Democrats is worth monitoring closely, as it could lead towards greater welfare chauvinism, anti-immigration positions, and a more robust approach to law-and-order policies.  

It is also notable that Sweden is scheduled to take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2023, with an expected focus on the protection and promotion of human rights around the world. The ascent of an openly anti-immigration party with far-right policy positions, if not handled carefully at domestic level, could be seen to undermine Sweden’s international reputation on these issues. Nonetheless, certain key elements of Swedish foreign policy would be unlikely to change, namely Sweden’s commitment to EU and NATO membership, which are both supported by all the major parties, including the Sweden Democrats.  

Whether the changing landscape of Swedish politics portends a shift towards a more protectionist vision of the EU’s place in the world remains to be seen, but the outcome and consequences of this election are likely to be watched closely by other small, liberal EU countries like Ireland.