Influence in the Indo-Pacific: The Transatlantic Alliance and China

To maintain a stable international order, the Transatlantic Alliance must adapt to counter the rising influence of China.  

by Grace Lundell

Introduction

The Transatlantic Alliance is a partnership between North American and European countries, primarily France, the UK, and Germany, which arose following the Second World War. It is represented most clearly by, but not limited to, NATO, which consists of the US, Canada, and 28 European states.[1] [2] The founding tenets of this Alliance – a shared respect for liberal democracy, the rule of law, and free trade – have become the principles of the liberal international order. For much of the Alliance’s existence, the key threat to this order was the Soviet Union. The primary goal of the Alliance in the second half of the 20^th century was to mitigate this threat.

In the post-Cold War era, amid the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organising principle of this Alliance became less clear. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has reinvigorated the Transatlantic Alliance. The conflict has highlighted the threat that Moscow once again poses to the liberal order. However, on 26 May 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that: “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”[3] If, as Secretary Blinken stated, China is now the true challenge to the status quo, and not Russia, the Transatlantic Alliance must adapt to confront a different set of challenges than that which was posed by the Soviet Union or Russia.

While Russia’s blatant disregard for the norms of territorial sovereignty and the laws of war represent a significant threat to the international order, it is China that presents the greatest threat over the long term. The Global Firepower Index, which ranks the capability of countries to wage conventional war by considering more than 50 factors, ranks Russia as the second most powerful nation and China as the third.[4] However, the difference between the two rankings is marginal and China may overtake Russia in the coming years as China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernise, fuelled by Beijing’s continued economic growth.[5] Additionally, Russia’s GDP of $1.78 trillion is dwarfed by China’s, which grew to $17.73 trillion in 2021.[6]

China as a Great Power

In recent years, China has used its considerable economic and military power to advance its aims in ways which threaten the liberal order. For example, China has contravened the World Trade Organization’s core liberal economic principle of ‘non-discrimination’ by forcing foreign companies to share their intellectual property in order to gain access to China’s extensive domestic market.[7] Chinese military posturing and island-building in the South China Sea disregard international law and territorial integrity.[8] Furthermore, domestically, Beijing’s “re-education” of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, and its repression of protests in Hong Kong, undermines the principal of participatory government, and, in the case of the Uighurs, the Genocide Convention.[9] [10] [11]

Arguably, the Transatlantic Alliance as it stands is not best suited to combat these threats posed by China. Whereas, in the 20^th Century, geopolitical concerns centred around the US, Europe, and the USSR, the future of the 21^st century will also be decided by competition in the Indo-Pacific, a vast region which spans from the west coast of the US to the west coast of India.[12] Although China is extending its influence globally through the Belt-and-Road Initiative,[13] it is in the Indo-Pacific region where China has most extensively expanded its power.

China’s Influence in the Indo-Pacific

Examples of China’s influence in the region include Beijing’s recent security agreement with the Solomon Islands that allows the archipelago nation to request police and military assistance from China to maintain social order;[14] Beijing’s attempts to influence Chinese populations in Australia;[15] and the increasing ties between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Indonesian political parties.[16] The Indo-Pacific is also the region in which China has perpetrated its most aggressive violations of international law, as seen through the development of artificial islands in the South China Sea,[17] and Chinese naval incursions into the territorial seas of other nations.[18]

The Transatlantic Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

The growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region in geopolitical terms does not undermine the key role of the Transatlantic Alliance in the international order. The Transatlantic Alliance remains the strongest partnership between liberal democratic states. The economic success and political stability of these countries when working in concert ensures that the liberal order remains legitimate in the eyes of countries around the world. This credibility mitigates the ability of China to propose its own autocratic model as an alternative means of generating and sustaining prosperity and stability. Furthermore, the combined economies of the US and EU amount to more than 40% of world GDP,[19] granting them significant joint power and resources to counter Chinese aims.

To address China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific, the Transatlantic Alliance should further pivot eastwards. The Alliance could consider the twin challenges of deepening its own diplomatic, economic, and military ties while also working together to forge alliances with countries in the Indo-Pacific region that value participatory government, human rights, and liberal economics. The Biden administration in the US continues to try to increase both its outreach to Europe and to Asia. For example, along with its effort to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in concert with European allies, the US has initiated several high-level meetings and agreements with countries in the Indo-Pacific since the start of 2022 including:

• The 21 May 2022 upgrading of US-South Korea relations to a "global comprehensive strategic alliance”;[20]
• The 23 May 2022 announcement of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) of 13 countries, including Japan, India, Australia, and the Philippines;[21]
• The 24 June 2022 creation of Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) with Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and Japan to help to promote development in the Pacific islands.[22]

Other members of the Transatlantic Alliance also continue to engage in the Indo-Pacific. For example, on 1 July 2022, France announced “a new agenda for cooperation” with Australia.[23] Germany’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, published in August 2020, assert a desire to “[be] involved in shaping the Indo-Pacific”.[24] However, US and European engagement in the Indo-Pacific needs to be better integrated into the framework of the Transatlantic Alliance, utilising the resources of like-minded countries to forge alliances with the Indo-Pacific region. AUKUS and other agreements between the US, UK, and Pacific partners are a start,[25] but such agreements should reach beyond the Anglo-American wing of the Alliance. The participation of Indo-Pacific leaders at the 28-30 June 2022 NATO Madrid Summit is an important first step,[26] as is the statement in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept that it will aim to “strengthen dialogue and cooperation” in the Indo-Pacific.[27]

To ensure that further progress is made, members of the Transatlantic Alliance must adopt a consensus on the threat that China poses to the international order. The US and UK clearly regard China as a threat. For example, on 6 July 2022, MI5 and the FBI issued a joint statement warning of the “immense” threat China poses to economic and national security.[28] However, there is a subtle difference in approach when compared with that of continental European powers. For instance, former French finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, wrote in 2021: “The United States wants to confront China. The European Union wants to engage China.”[29] Admittedly, views in Europe towards China are changing. In February 2022, the EU released a new strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region that goes beyond simply promoting respect for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and represents a “stepping up [of] strategic engagement” to address Chinese ambitions.[30] Furthermore, in May, Chancellor Olaf Scholz urged German companies to diversify their supply chains and markets to decrease their reliance on China.[31] However, France still asserts a desire to “champion a third path” in its April 2021 Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, conveying an unwillingness to align itself squarely with the US outlook.

An alignment of views on China should not mean that European countries necessarily acquiesce to the perspectives of the US. Instead, all members of the Transatlantic Alliance should seek to engage jointly with democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific region to promote and defend the fundamental principles of the Alliance, including free trade, participatory government, and respect for liberal democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In so doing, the Transatlantic Alliance could support nations of the Indo-Pacific in their ability to resist China’s efforts to extend its power and influence.