What is the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity 

In March 2022, the EU announced its intention to form its EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EURDC). Against the backdrop of growing global crises, in particular the EU’s experience of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the EU has come to realise that it needs a greater capacity to respond to international crises outside of the European Union. As part of its ‘ACT’ section, the EURDC forms one of the flagship components of the EU’s Strategic Compass, the Union’s Security Strategy. It will be staffed by 5000 military personnel and is intended to be operational by 2025. Moreover, the EURDC will be capable of operating across multiple domains, including air, land, and sea, and will be outfitted with key strategic enablers including air-to-air refuelling, strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and medical facilities. Overall, the EURDC is imagined to be of use to the EU in two possible scenarios which would warrant their activation. The first is participating in the initial phases of stabilisation missions such as that which occurred in Mali, and the second, based on recent experience in Afghanistan and Sudan, would be participating in rescue and evacuation missions. 

The EURDC builds on, and is a reformulation of, the existing EU Battlegroup concept. The EU battlegroups have been operational since 2007 and are comprised of military units with up to 1500 personnel. Amongst the notable criticisms of the EU Battlegroup concept has been that they have never been deployed, largely due to a lack of political will and the requirement for unanimity in Council decisions on EU Common Security and Defence Policy. A second barrier has also emerged due to the present funding model of the Battlegroups, where costs ‘lie-where-they-fall’, such that they are borne by the Member State which chooses to deploy its forces with the Battlegroup. Amongst the primary differences between the EURDC and the Battlegroups is size, with the EURDC increasing the number of personnel from 1500 to 5000; the length of time at high readiness, increased from six months to a year; and that the EURDC will have a degree of  common funding. 

 

How will the EURDC be Deployed? 

The most pressing of priorities for the EURDC will be the ability for the EU to make faster decisions regarding deployment of forces outside of the EU. As noted earlier, the EU has been unable to deploy its Battlegroups due to the requirement for unanimity by the European Council in EU CSDP matters. However, the EURDC will more likely be able to make use of some flexibilities in EU decision-making, including constructive abstention, but most importantly Article 41.1 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), which would allow a “group of willing and able Member States to plan and conduct a mission” on the behalf of the Union. This potentially indicates a growing norm of flexibility within the EU regarding EU CSDP which may allow the Union to better respond to crises as they emerge, such as was also seen during the EU’s negotiations for the provision of Ukraine with military equipment via the European Peace Facility (EPF) in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. 

Furthermore, this normative shift to a more flexible approach to EU CSDP could indicate that the EU can act with the present tools at its disposal, and could feature in future conversations on Treaty reform regarding growing calls for increased use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) with regard to EU CSDP matters. 

Importantly, the EURDC will  also be funded by an extended scope of common costs which would include the costs of joint exercises. However, it is likely that the largest part of the financial burden will continue to be borne by the Member States themselves. 

 

What are the risks to the EURDC’s Success? 

The obstacles to the EURDC’s success are similar to the obstacles which have haunted the EU Battlegroup concept:  funding and political will. The scale of the ambition of the EURDC has only amplified the risks to the EURDC initiative. Amongst the primary limiting factors to the success of the EURDC is, and will continue to be, financing. Though, as mentioned above, a greater pool of common funding will be made available for joint exercises, should the primary financial burden continue to fall on troop-contributing Member States, it will be unlikely that Member States will contribute assets at a time when resources are increasingly limited and defence budgets strained by geostrategic conditions.  

Secondly, the issue of political buy-in by Member States will become a greater challenge as long as the war in Ukraine continues to threaten Eastern European Member States. In particular, many Member States in Eastern Europe such as Poland are prioritising territorial defence in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and are devoting the main thrust of their attention to NATO rather than EU Crisis Management. At a time where many of the Bloc’s Members feel they are facing a growing existential threat from the Russian Federation, the EU may find it challenging to generate sufficient buy-in from Member States to provide troops to be at high readiness for a 12 month period, while also receiving the key advanced strategic enablers, air-to-air refuelling, ISR, and Strategic Airlift, needed to be able to realise the level of ambition set out in the Strategic Compass.  

 

The EURDC: An Opportunity for Ireland to Demonstrate its Commitment to Europe? 

The EURDC does provide Ireland with an opportunity to play a larger role in EU CSDP, European defence, and in Europe as a whole while respecting Ireland’s traditional policy of neutrality. Announced in October 2022, Ireland has already committed to providing a company of troops, about 100-120 personnel. This commitment comes at an important time for Ireland. In particular, as many of Europe’s Member States to the East are prioritising their own national defence, this could allow Ireland to fill in potential gaps in troop numbers. Moreover, a commitment by Ireland to the EURDC, both in terms of personnel and their costs, coupled with the appointment of Lieutenant General Sean Clancy to Chair the EU Military Committee, may see Ireland playing a somewhat outsized role in Europe’s security architecture, at a key moment when the EU is seeking to be a more active player in the defence of the continent. However, it should be noted that the issue of allowances for Defence Forces personnel offers a potential pitfall for Ireland’s participation in this initiative. At present, service members will receive 15EUR per day, relative to the 116EUR per day received by personnel serving under the UN in the UNIFIL Mission in South Lebanon. A lack of buy-in from Defence Forces personnel may threaten Ireland’s participation, and the cost of allowances could be considered against the net-gain resulting from Ireland’s participation in the EURDC.  

That Ireland needs to do more in terms of defence is well established and accepted by policymakers. However, a genuine commitment by the Irish government to the EURDC and EU CSDP, which includes generating buy-in from Defence Forces personnel, could help ameliorate criticism that Ireland is  a weak link in European security. Ultimately, the appointment of Ireland’s most senior military officer to a leading role in the EU marks an opportunity for Ireland to play an important part in shaping the agenda for European defence. While this is certainly a step in the right direction, the EURDC offers a substantial opportunity for Ireland to demonstrate a real commitment, backed by money and manpower, to Europe’s security; to perhaps rehabilitate Ireland’s reputation in this domain, especially amongst the EU’s Members in Eastern Europe; and to play an even greater role in shaping the future direction of the EU as a whole.