The European Union in 12 Objects 2. The Weighing Scales | IIEA
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The European Union in 12 Objects   2. The Weighing Scales

Bobby McDonagh, Former Ambassador to the EU and UK,  has developed a series of blogs, to explain what the European Union is and how it works. The publication of this blog series by the IIEA will be phased over 12 weeks, each dealing with one of the 12 Objects. Find out more here

Compromise is the lifeblood of the European Union. Friendly and fair relations between countries, and between EU institutions, cannot work without significant give and take. Compromise is not just the end product of European negotiations. It is the EU’s very way of doing business. Compromise is deeply embedded in the very process of EU negotiations.

When the EU Commission tables a legislative proposal, that proposal already represents a compromise within the Commission between different priorities, objectives and national perspectives. From the moment when Member States then begin to discuss the Commission’s proposal in the Council of Ministers, they work to refine and adjust the draft so that every national point of view is taken into account to the maximum extent possible and so that ultimately there will be a sufficient majority to approve the law. The Council then negotiates its version of the proposal with the European Parliament with a view to agreeing yet another compromise.

It is thus clear that the weighing scales required by the European Union is necessarily a highly sophisticated one, perhaps the most complex, subtle and flexible such mechanism ever required in the relations between free democratic countries. The EU is not merely balancing two points of view, as in a “bilateral” negotiation between two individuals or countries, already often a huge challenge. It must rather balance the interests of twenty-seven Member States. It must navigate the different perspectives of the EU’s three major institutions. As if that were not enough, it must at the same time keep its eye firmly on the real prize, namely the adoption of coherent and ambitions policies that will serve Europe as a whole, as well as its Member States and citizens.

Compromise is about respect between nations, as between individuals. It is the opposite approach to that of the growing number of global bullies who believe that might is right, especially those who invade other countries or threaten to do so. The EU’s processes are the antithesis of the populist approach of promising unachievable simple answers to complex problems. 

In the long run, compromise is not just about decency in relationships. It’s also the best way to advance lasting interests. “The Winner Takes It All” is an ABBA song, not a negotiating strategy.

How Compromise Works in the European Union

Compromise in the European Union is driven both by legally-binding mechanisms and by an ethos of respect.

As regards legally-binding mechanisms, the EU is based on, and circumscribed by, the rule of law. The Union is based on its Treaties that have been formally approved by each of the Member States, either by referendum or by their national parliaments depending on the constitutional requirement in each case. The EU cannot act, by legislation or otherwise, outside of those Treaties. The EU’s Court of Justice guarantees that the European Treaties and legislation are upheld in every respect. It can impose penalties, notably fines, to ensure that that is the case.

One of the important things prescribed by the EU Treaties is how the EU reaches its decisions. The precise roles, rights and operation of the Commission, Council and Parliament, which I will explain in more detail in later chapters, are a matter neither of conjecture nor whim.

Legislation is necessarily proposed by the Commission and then adopted in co-decision between the Council and Parliament. The compromises they must reach between them in that context are not dictated principally by how effectively they throw their weight around in a particular case or by the caprice of the moment. The quest for interinstitutional compromises is entirely unavoidable because that is what the Treaties’ decision-making procedures require.

Likewise, the Member States within the Council must reach agreement according to the various decision-making procedures prescribed by the Treaties.

Unanimity is required for foreign policy decisions, in a small number of other very sensitive areas including taxation, and for the broad policy matters determined at the highest level by the European Council (comprised of the 27 Heads of State or Government). In other words, in such cases the agreement of every Member State is required for any decision and one Member State alone can block anything. This is sometimes referred to as a “veto”.

On the other hand, the vast majority of legislation can be agreed by what is called a qualified majority of Member States in the Council of Ministers (as well as, in a parallel process, between the Council and the European Parliament). The qualified majority system assigns a certain number of votes to each Member State - the more populous a Member State, the more votes it has. However, the Member States with smaller populations have more votes than a simple translation of their population size would justify. The number of these weighted votes when added together must reach a specified threshold, and at the same time represent a specific percentage of EU’s overall population, for the proposed legislation to be adopted.

These binding decision-making systems, which ensure that every Member State’s rights are taken into account, necessarily require compromise, both in how negotiations are conducted and in the agreements eventually reached.

These legally binding arrangements distinguish European Union decision-making radically from those who act unilaterally in relations between countries or who try to do so - by relying on military aggression, by declaring unilateral tariffs or by generally dismissing international law.  It is highly significant that there is no such thing as “unilateral” action within the EU. No European institution, no Member State and no combination of them can override the decision-making rules and protections set out in the EU Treaties and guaranteed by the European Court of Justice. The only option for any Member State or States that cannot get their way within the EU’s procedures is to act outside those Treaties. Any such action would be without the support, weight, budget or imprimatur of the European Union.  

Compromise within the EU is not only necessitated by its mandatory procedures but is also encouraged by its ethos of respect. The ethos of relations between the twenty-seven Member States is one of respect for the interests and sensitivities of others.

Every Member State is entitled to make known its views at every level and at every stage of negotiating every proposal. Those national views are listened to respectfully because that is the EU’s way of doing business. Every Member State realises that, if it wants its own concerns to be taken into account, it must likewise take account of the concerns of others.

Each proposal is gradually shaped to reflect, insofar as possible, all of the perspectives that are brought to the table. The advocates of a proposal understandably maintain an eye on the target of reaching the necessary qualified majority to approve it. This means adjusting the proposal by means of compromises to make it more acceptable to reluctant Member States and to bring them on board. However, the process is not a mere mathematical calculation of voting weights. Every effort is made to satisfy the reasonable requests  of every Member State. The ethos of EU negotiations is not one of isolating a minority but of accommodating all to the maximum extent possible. 

Similarly, in those cases where unanimity applies for a decision to be reached, the norm is one of mutual respect. One Member State may be legally entitled to block a proposal but it normally listens in good faith to the legitimate perspectives of others. At the same time, the majority respects the legal right of one or more Member States to exercise their veto on a proposal although it may engage, sometimes assertively, in support its point of view.

The ethos of respect must, of course, work both ways. There have been some cases, especially recently as reflected in Hungary’s approach to  Ukraine, of one European Government digging in its heels, not in defence of reasonable national concerns,  but in support of an approach that challenges the EU’s fundamental values and interests. That Member State’s lack of respect for the interests of its partners has meant a fraying, in turn, of the respect to which it would otherwise be entitled. Where this will lead remains to be seen.

Compromise means of course, as in any negotiation, that no party can obtain everything that it wants. The principle of every compromise agreement is that you give something to get something. Bargaining is often referred to appropriately as “give-and-take”. This is usually understood in the European Union, but not always.

Some politicians, especially those with populist tendencies, see compromise as a process of conceding things rather than what it truly is, namely a means of achieving them. Such a failure to understand the nature compromise was, in my view, the underlying misunderstanding that led to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. I was Ireland’s Ambassador in London when David Cameron, who eventually called the fatal Brexit referendum, became Prime Minister. I was astonished that some newly appointed senior Government ministers had no idea how successful the British negotiating effort in Brussels had been over many years - arguably  the most effective of all the then twenty-eight Member States - and believed it needed to be overhauled. The problem was that they saw compromise as surrender and seemed to believe in the fantasy that you don’t need to take the rough with the smooth. It was little surprise that one of Cameron’s successors later slid so far down the populist road that his political philosophy was summarised by his mantra that the UK should “have its cake and eat it”. 

There can, more generally, be a tendency of national representatives in the EU, encouraged sometimes by their national media, to blame Europe for the parts of a Brussels compromise that they don’t like and to claim credit for the usually more significant  elements that will be well received at home.

Moreover, a few national ministers may need to be persuaded from time to time that compromise requires prioritisation between national objectives or that a concession to others on one issue may be the best means to achieve a concession that we require on a more important issue.

The EU’s decision-making procedures are highly complex and can be painstakingly slow. However, complexity, in a world of increasingly shallow oversimplification, is to be warmly celebrated. Some sneer at Europe’s complexity and even laugh at it. The EU’s complexity may indeed be funny but, personally, I never find it quite as funny as the centuries of war that preceded it on the European continent or than the brutality that characterises so many other parts of the world today.

A well-calibrated weighing-scales is an essential part of the EU’s equipment.