Author: Loqman Radpey

The Kurds, the Middle East’s largest stateless people, have historically been divided across Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union due to British, French, and Russian geopolitical manoeuvres. Following the final stage of Kurdistan’s division and the incorporation of its southern segment in 1926 into what later became Iraq, the Kurds now have a rare opportunity to reshape their future amid regional and geopolitical shifts. But with opportunity comes risk, and the lessons of past political missteps must serve as a guide for the Kurds of Rojava (Western) Kurdistan in northeastern Syria. The Kurds are faced with the opportunity to secure meaningful autonomy and justice, but their path forward remains uncertain.

General Mazloum Abdi, the Kurdish Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), recently affirmed his support for “the unity and integrity of Syrian territory” and rejected “division projects that threaten the country’s unity” in a written message to Agence France Presse (AFP). While he emphasised the importance of stability and constructive dialogue among Syrians, General Abdi did not, however, outline specific conditions for this support.

Under international law, the principle of territorial integrity is incontrovertible in relations between states, rather than between states and non-state actors, such as the Kurds, or seceding entities, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Kosovo case. History offers cautionary lessons for Kurdish leaders seeking to negotiate autonomy within hostile host states. The experience of Southern Kurdistan (Bashûr) in Iraq serves as a particularly potent example of this.

In Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani sought autonomy for the Kurds within the framework of a federal Iraqi state, which led to the establishment of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Yet, their pact with the new central Iraqi government proved short-lived, as Baghdad failed to honour Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which mandated a resolution for Kurdish territorial disputes by the end of 2007. This failure underscores a critical reality: agreements without effective enforcement mechanisms more often than not fail to adequately secure self-determination. When an independence referendum was held in the KRG in September 2017, the Kurds suffered significant territorial losses as the Iraqi government used military force, backed by Iran, to take back over 40% of the territory the Kurds had controlled since the emergence of ISIS in 2014. This included some disputed territories which Baghdad had committed to working with the KRG to resolve under the auspices of the aforementioned Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution.

Meanwhile, Turkey has occupied portions of Rojava Kurdistan since 2018, imposing the use of Turkish symbols, and has been changing the demographic composition of majority Kurdish areas through forced migration and the construction of settlements, backed by Kuwait, Pakistan, and Qatar. The reversal of Turkey’s actions and the return of the Kurds to their homes among much else, makes any negotiations for establishing a new, inclusive Syria all the more complex.

For states to claim the protection of territorial integrity, they must safeguard the rights of all national and ethnic groups within their borders. The violation of such rights under the guise of preserving territorial unity is unacceptable under international law (see Paragraph 7 of UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV)). A new Syrian Constitution, which could take up to three years to draft, according to the new government in Damascus, must explicitly recognise Kurdish concerns surrounding their right to preserve their national and cultural identity, their right to self-determination, and the possibility of independence. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Kurds are entitled to demand a sovereign state of their own with control over their natural resources. Still, secession —unless driven by severe human rights violations or the unilateral revocation of autonomy— remains unsupported in contemporary state practice without the consent of the mother state. The cases of Catalonia and the KRG could be two examples.

In Syria, the Kurds control one-third of the country’s territory, although these areas are not predominantly Kurdish. This hard-won position should put the Kurds in a powerful negotiating position. However, Turkey remains insistent on the disarmament of the Kurdish forces and remains staunchly opposed to any form of Kurdish administration, including in the form of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Meanwhile, the de facto leadership in Damascus remains weak due to the lack of a unified military among other things, creating an opening for the Kurds to stand firm on their stance without concessions. The SDF, under General Abdi, remains a formidable force, yet Kurdish leaders must contend with ongoing pressure from Damascus, which operates under Turkey’s influence. Overall, Ankara’s long-standing hostility towards Kurdish aspirations complicates the regional calculus.

Additionally, SDF’s control of oil-rich regions provides a crucial bargaining chip for the Kurds. Resource sovereignty is central to ensuring the economic viability of any autonomous Kurdish region. Past failures in Iraq, including frequent budget cuts and delays in public sector salary payments, should also serve as a cautionary tale for leaders and would-be leaders across the region. Kurdish negotiators ought to prioritise enforceable agreements that safeguard economic interests and prevent exploitation by others, including the Syrian government.

Since establishing self-rule in Rojava Kurdistan in Syria in 2012, the Kurds have adopted a governance model inspired by democratic confederalism, a framework proposed by Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/PKK) leader currently imprisoned in Turkey. This system, which rejects secession from Syria, promotes inclusivity, grassroots democracy, and pluralism, framing Kurdish autonomy as a potential stabilising force in the region. However, in a recent discussion in the UK House of Commons, Ilham Ahmed, co-president of the Executive Council of the AANES, stated that “the best solution for a democratic system in Syria is federalism.” Either way, to achieve secure long-term stability and recognition, the Kurdish leadership must, as it has been doing since 2012, focus on strengthening their governance structures, demonstrating effective administration, and aligning their efforts with broader international norms. Doing so will not only bolster their legitimacy but also increase their appeal to key global stakeholders, including the U.S. and the European Union.

Indeed, after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in early December 2024, the West, particularly the European Union and United States, has backed the Kurds of Rojava. However, this support cannot be guaranteed indefinitely at this turbulent geopolitical moment. Political shifts —such as the return of Donald Trump to the White House— could alter the trajectory of U.S. involvement, for example.

The Kurds have paid a steep price for their current autonomy. Whether in Iraq, achieved through the U.S.-led intervention against Saddam Hussein, or in Syria, forged through strife and civil war, Kurdish sacrifices have been considerable. Since 2012, over 12,000 Kurdish fighters have died, and 15,000 have been injured in Rojava Kurdistan alone in their fight against ISIS and other extremist terrorist groups.

The Kurds’ struggle for autonomy and independence should galvanise their resolve to secure a future that guarantees the safety and autonomy of their peoples. The Kurds have the right to demand a political framework that guarantees their security, cultural preservation, and prosperity. By learning from past mistakes and leveraging their current position, the Kurds have a unique opportunity to carve out a future that ensures the establishment of a second recognised Kurdish political entity in the Middle East, with the very real potential for statehood in the future.

On 10 March 2025, General Abdi and the self-proclaimed  interim president of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa, signed an agreement setting out their intentions for the governance of the de facto autonomous majority-Kurdish region. The accord addresses the importance of “[e]nsuring the return of all displaced Syrians to their towns and villages and ensuring their protection by the Syrian State.” Another provision speaks of “[i]ntegrating all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields.” The implementation of the agreement, through the creation of “executive committees”, is scheduled to take place by the end of 2025. However, given Syria’s relatively unstable situation, the nine-month timeline may prove to be too lengthy, with ongoing developments likely necessitating adjustments.

Three days later, on 13 March 2025, al-Sharaa enacted a temporary constitution (“Constitutional Declaration”) reaffirming the Syrian State’s identity as the “Syrian Arab Republic,” establishing Arabic as the only official language, and designating Islamic jurisprudence as “the primary source of legislation” for the adoption of laws and regulations governing the country. Notably, some of these provisions directly contradict commitments made to General Abdi in the aforementioned agreement. In response, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council, the SDF’s political wing, and AANES dismissed the Constitution, denouncing it as a reinforcement of “an individualistic mindset” and as bringing things back to square one. Outraged by what they see as an abandonment of inclusivity and self-rule, Kurds have taken to the streets in protest to oppose the transitional Constitution.

Kurds and other national, ethnic, and religious minorities across Syria including Christians, Druzes, and Alawis face considerable challenges in light of these events. The newly declared constitution not only risks undermining their rights but also signals a return to the centralisation, Arab nationalism, and exclusionary policies of the past regime. If left unchallenged, this framework could pave the way for renewed repression and jeopardises the prospects for a return to genuine power-sharing. As negotiations evolve, a key challenge will be ensuring that the rights and strategic interests of the Kurds are not overlooked in the political settlement. Navigating this delicate balance will be essential to securing a genuinely sustainable political framework, and one that can pave the way for long-term stability in the Middle East.

Dr Loqman Radpey, an expert on Kurdistan and the Middle East, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum with over a decade of experience analyzing the legal and political dimensions of conflicts in the Middle East, including the Kurdistani regions in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. He is the author of ‘Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law’ (published by Routledge in 2023), the first comprehensive historico-legal account of Kurdish aspirations for statehood from a Middle Eastern perspective within post-World War I peace agreements and the broader discourse of self-determination in international law literature over time. His upcoming work, “Self-Determination during the Cold War”, will appear in ‘The Cambridge History of International Law’ (Volume XI).